Consider a decision maker who has to choose one of several alternatives, and who is imperfectly informed about the payoff of each of them. In each period, the decision maker has to decide whether to stop and take one of the alternatives, or to continue researching the alternatives. New information is costly and is never conclusive. We provide a dynamic programming formulation of the decision maker's problem with either a finite deadline or no deadline, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for research to take place for some prior beliefs about the alternatives. We show that, at least for short deadlines, the decision maker either explores the best alternative and stops after good news, or explores the second best alternative and stops after bad news, with the former path being optimal if the decision maker is relatively optimistic about the payoff of the alternatives.
• (Policy search) A collective decision making group has to choose one of a set of available policies to promote a given group objective. The consequences of choosing any policy are not known surely but the group can devote time and effort to researching the alternatives prior to any final decision. Similarly, legislative committees often have the responsibility of determining the alternative to a given status quo policy, prior to the general assembly voting over whether to maintain the status quo or to reject it in favour of the alternative. The committee first engages in costly research to decide upon which of the available alternatives to propose.
• (House hunting) A family is considering several alternatives for a new home. At each moment in time, the family can visit only one of the new houses, and obtains an imperfect signal of the house quality, until making a final decision on which house to buy.
• (Hiring decision) A firm is considering several candidates for a job. At each moment the firm can acquire new information about one of the candidates, for instance by conducting an interview or organizing a visit, until making a final decision on which candidate to hire.
• (Exploratory drilling) An oil company is hesitating between a number of potential drilling locations. Before exploitation starts, then, it can do some exploratory drilling using drilling methods that are cheaper than a production well.
• (Nest search) A beehive, composed of perfectly altruistic individuals, must decide on the location of a new nest. Locations can be investigated one at a time, by sending a scout who reports truthfully to the hive. The bees have to decide at each moment which location to investigate and when to stop and move jointly to a new nest location.
Each of these applications has been analyzed using some application of the following canonical frameworks, none of which fully captures our set-up:
1. Bandits. A defining characteristic of bandit problems is that the alternatives are statistically independent. Although this is true of the alternatives in our model, exploring any alternative here yields only a noisy signal of that alternative's payoff: payoffs from an alternative can be realized only if the decision maker stops exploring and chooses that alternative. An important consequence of these features is that the exploration-values of alternatives are no longer statistically independent.
2. Pandora's Box. In a Pandora box problem, a decision maker obtains a perfectly informative signal about each alternative after investigating it. In our problem, instead, information obtained about an alternative is never conclusive, so that it may be optimal to investigate the same alternative more than once.
3. Sequential sampling. In the classical sequential sampling problem, the sequence of experiments is fixed in advance. In the related sequential search problem, experiments correspond to different alternatives arriving randomly over time. In the costly research problem, the variable of interest is the intensity rather than the direction of search. In our problem, the decision maker can decide which experiment to perform at each moment in time before settling for one of the alternatives.
The decision maker of interest here is required to find the optimal sequencing of experiments, taking into account the information available at each moment. As is well known, in both the bandit and Pandora problems, it is possible to construct an index for each alternative with information about that alternative alone, such that the decision maker's optimal choice in any period is the alternative with the highest index. We show that in our problem, the value of exploring each alternative is linked to beliefs about the other alternatives in a way that does not admit construction of an independent index for each of the alternatives. In particular, we show (theorem 5.1) that whether investigating the top or the second alternative is optimal depends on beliefs about the third, even if the third is not immediately investigated.
We offer an analytical characterization of the optimal policy when there are two remaining periods before a final decision must be made. If beliefs about the top two alternatives are close to symmetric, then it is optimal to investigate either one of the top two and to stop afterwards, selecting the alternative with larger posterior expected value. If beliefs about the top two alternatives are asymmetric enough, and initial beliefs are relatively optimistic (in a sense that we make precise), then it is optimal to investigate the top alternative, to stop after good news, and to investigate again after bad news. Finally, if beliefs about the top two alternatives are asymmetric enough, and initial beliefs are relatively pessimistic, then it is optimal to investigate the second alternative, to stop after after bad news, and to investigate again after good news.
The problem we investigate is related to the multi-armed bandit problem. Payoffs from playing any arm (exploring an alternative) in bandit problems are generated in every period. Specifically, the payoff from playing any arm depends only on outcomes in periods during which the arm is played and is therefore statistically independent of any other arm. The literature on bandit problems is considerable: Berry and Fristedt (1985) and Gittins et al. (2011) offer overviews of the theory and Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) provide a succinct summary of some major applications in economics. The key result from the theory is that so long as the arms are independent, the optimal exploration rule is characterized by an index, the Gittins Index (Gittins, 1979) , which allows to rank the alternatives in terms of their desirability. 1 In our framework, payoffs only occur once all exploration has stopped permanently and, although the payoff from the chosen alternative at any date is independent of the payoffs associated with other alternatives, the value of exploration is not, as remarked above, so independent, undermining the possibility of an index characterization of an optimal exploration rule.
In the Pandora's problem, introduced by Weitzman (1979), there is a given set of mutually exclusive options and a DM (Pandora) who chooses the order in which to investigate alternatives and when to stop investigating. The reward associated with any given option is unknown ex ante and can be enjoyed only after Pandora stops investigation and chooses the alternative with the highest observed reward. The distribution of rewards for any alternative and its cost of investigation are known. The true payoff from any alternative, however, is fully revealed conditional on exploring that alternative. Assuming that Pandora's objective is to maximize her discounted expected reward net of aggregate search costs, Weitzman (1979) proves that the optimal search rule for his setting is described by a "reservation price rule" akin to the Gittins index. Recent extensions of the Pandora box problem include Olszewski and Weber (2016) and Doval (2018) . The key difference between our set-up and theirs is that exploration in Weitzman's environment yields the true value of any alternative but this is never the case for the model below. As a result, the DM in our model may revisit previously investigated alternatives multiple times. Furthermore, we show that no reservation price or index rule exists in our model.
The classical sequential sampling problem was introduced by Wald (1945 Wald ( , 1947 and by Blackwell and Girshick (1954) . McCall (1970) , Mortensen (1986) and a large literature afterwards investigate the sequential search or job search problem. Moscarini and Smith (2001) introduce a general dynamic model of costly research in which an impatient decision maker (DM) has to choose one from a set of alternatives, the respective payoff of which depends on the true state of the world. Before choosing, the DM can acquire noisy information over time about the state at a (state-independent) cost. The main difference between their setup and ours is that they focus on the intensity of research, while we focus on the direction of research. In particular, they assume decision making in continuous time; the costs of information regarding the true state are strictly convex increasing in the level of information acquisition; and state-specific payoffs across the set of alternatives are not limited to be one of two values as in our model. In addition to characterizing when information acquisition stops and an alternative chosen, their main result, among several, is that the optimal level of information acquisition increases in the Bellman value prior to choosing an alternative. 2 In our model, however, learning occurs piecemeal through sequentially exploring specific alternatives and we focus on the optimal decision at any time regarding which alternative, if any, to explore.
Less closely related contributions in the large literature on strategic experimentation include Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller et al. (2005) . Both papers, discussed along with others by Moscarini and Smith (2001) , study dynamic information acquisition models with two alternatives, in which there are many individuals simultaneously making information acquisition decisions through time. All information discovered is public. The additional tensions addressed in these papers, therefore, involve individuals' opportunities to free-ride on others' search.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the model and section 3 formulates the DM's problem as a dynamic optimization problem, establishing a variety of useful results. The following two sections, respectively, completely characterize the optimal research policy when the number of research periods remaining before a decision is either one (section 4) or two (section 5). Section 6 provides a partial characterization of the optimal policy for a longer horizon, while section 7 provides a computed example. Section 8 concludes. The appendix contains some auxiliary proofs.
The exploration problem
Time runs discretely, from t = 0 to infinity. There is a finite set of alternatives X, indexed by x 2 X = {1, . . . , n}. Each alternative has a quality w x 2 {0, 1} indicating whether it is low quality or high quality. The qualities of the alternatives are independent random variables and their realization are not observed by the decision maker (DM). At time 0, beliefs about the quality of each alternative are given by p 0 = (p 0 x ), where p 0 x 2 (0, 1) indicates the prior probability that alternative x is high quality. There is a deadline
if no alternative has been chosen yet, the DM can either research one of the alternatives in X, or choose one of the alternatives in X. If t 6 = •, then the DM must choose an alternative at time t if no alternative has been chosen yet.
If alternative x is researched, then the DM obtains a payoff u t = c  0 in that period, and gets to observe a signal s t x 2 {0, 1}. If alternative x is chosen at time t, the DM obtains the payoff u t = w x in that period, and the payoff u t 0 = 0 in every subsequent period. That is, choosing an alternative is irreversible. DM's utility is the discounted sum of period payoffs, Â t 0 d t u t , where d 2 (0, 1). Conditional on the quality of the alternative, signals are drawn independently of previous signals of the same or other alternatives, with probability distribution given by
, where s t x = 0 represents "bad news" and s t x = 1 represents "good news" about alternative x. Researching alternative x in period t allows the DM to update beliefs about alternative x while keeping beliefs about other alternatives constant.
A plan p specifies for each time 0  t < t such that no alternative is chosen yet, an action a 2 X [ {s x } x2X , with a = x meaning 'research alternative x,' and a = s x meaning 'stop and choose alternative x,' as a function of the initial beliefs and the history of actions and signals in every previous period. If t 6 = •, a plan specifies as well an action a 2 {s x } x2X in period t, if the DM has not chosen an alternative yet, as a function of the initial beliefs and the history of actions and signals in every previous period. A plan p is optimal if the expected utility of adopting p is larger than or equal to the expected utility of adopting any other plan for any possible initial beliefs.
Since we are interested in optimal plans, we restrict henceforth the set of available actions before the deadline to be A = X [ {s}, with a = s meaning 'stop and choose one of the alternatives with maximum (updated) probability of being high quality,' and simply assume that one of the alternatives with maximum (updated) probability of being high quality is chosen at the deadline if society has not chosen yet.
Given the history of previous actions and signals before any period t 1, let p t = {p t x } denote the (updated) beliefs that each alternative x is high quality. Let P = [0, 1] n be the set of possible beliefs. We say that a plan is Markovian if for every t 0 there is a function f t : P ! A such that p specifies action f t (p) at time t if p t = p. We refer to f t as the policy associated to Markovian plan p at time t. We say that a plan p is stationary if there is a function f : P ! A such that p specifies action f (p) after every history such that p t = p for every t 0. That is, a stationary plan specifies the same policy every period. Obviously, stationary plans are of interest if t = •.
Dynamic programming formulation
We can describe the DM's problem a dynamic programing problem as follows. Our state space is P = [0, 1] n . The set of actions is the same for all states and is given by A for all t < t and by {s} for t t. The reward function is given by
Note that, in order to adapt the problem to a recursive formulation, we specify a per period utility after stopping such that the expected discounted utility is equal to the highest belief at the time of stopping, which is obtained if choosing optimally at that time. Given any state p 2 P, we denote p x+ the state given by p x+ y = p y for all y 2 X \ {x} and
Similarly, we denote p x the state given by p x y = p y for all y 2 X \ {x} and
Note that p + x and p x are the updated beliefs about alternative x after 'good news' and 'bad news,' respectively. 3 Let also
, denote the probability of 'good news' and 'bad news' about alternative x, respectively.
The law of motion, giving us the probability distribution over future states given the current state and action is given by note that S(p) is finite. Note that the parameters of our dynamic programming problem are the number of alternatives n, the cost of research c, the quality of information q, the discount factor d, and the deadline t.
Let W be the space of bounded continuous functions W : P ! ¬, equipped with the sup norm, and let the transformation T : W ! W be defined by
It is easy to see that T satisfy the Blackwell conditions, that is (a) W W 0 for all p implies TW TW 0 for all p, and (b) for any constant b, T (W + b) = TW + db. Hence, from theorem 5 in Blackwell (1965) , T is a contraction with modulus d, that is ||TW TW 0 ||  d||W W 0 ||. From the Banach fixed-point theorem, T has a unique fixed point V 2 W satisfying
and moreover ||T n W V ||  d n ||W V || for all n.
Let V be the space of continuous functions W : P ! [0, 1], and note that V is a closed subset of W and moreover,
x ; this is the expected utility of the Markovian plan with policy f t (p) = s for all p for all t 0; by necessity, it is the expected utility of the optimal plan if the deadline is t = 0. Then iteratively define W k 2 V by
is the expected utility of a Markovian plan that specifies a selection
⇤ for every 0  t < k, and f t (p) = s for t k. We have:
Theorem 3.1. Fix n, c, q, and d. (i) If t 6 = •, a Markovian plan is optimal if and only if its expected utility in period t, as a function of current beliefs, is given by W t t for each t  t. Moreover, there is a Markovian optimal plan. (ii) If t = •, a stationary plan is optimal if and only if its expected utility, as function of current beliefs, is given every period by V satisfying equation 2. Moreover, there is a stationary optimal plan. Proof. Item (i) follows from backward induction. For item (ii), necessity and sufficiency of the optimality equation 2 follow from theorem 6(f) in Blackwell (1965) , which deals with infinite horizon discounted dynamic programming problems. Existence follows from theorem 7 in Blackwell (1965) , which establishes that there is in fact a stationary plan whose expected payoff satisfies equation 2 when the action set is finite.
Intuitively, W k (p) is the value associated to the DM problem when there remain k periods ahead before the deadline, and V (p) is the value when there is no deadline.
The following result establishes that in fact the sequence W t converges to V , and provides a computationally convenient bound.
Proof. Since increasing k relaxes the constraint requiringp k to stop at time k, it follows that the expected utility ofp k is larger than or equal to the expected utility ofp k 1 for any given initial beliefs, and smaller or equal to the expected utility of the optimal plan, or equivalently W k 1  W k  V for every k 1 and every p 2 P. From monotonicity, the definition of W k , and the fact that T is a contraction, we get
The bound in the statement of the theorem follows from rewriting the previous inequality.
The next result provides some convenient facts about the functions W k and V . Corollary 3.2. W k for k 0 and V are (i) permutation invariant and (ii) weakly increasing functions.
Proof. Part (i) is immediate from the definitions of W k and V . For part (ii), we claim first that if W k 1 is weakly increasing, then W k is weakly increasing. To see this, note that forp 2 P andp 2 P such thatp p and for any given alternative x, the distribution over P induced by Q(p 0 |p, x) exhibits first order stochastic dominance over the distribution over P induced by Q(p 0 |p, x). Hence, in the problem defining
k 1 is weakly increasing. The expected payoff of stopping, max
x p x , is also weakly increasing in p. Since W k (p) is the maximum of the expected payoffs of researching the different alternatives and the expected payoff of stopping, the claim follows. Since W 0 (p) = max x p x is weakly increasing, from the previous claim and induction it follows that W k is weakly increasing for all k 0. Since {W k } converges to V (theorem 3.1), it follows that V is weakly increasing as well.
For k 1, let
be the expected payoff of researching alternative x if there are k remaining periods and the DM chooses optimally from next period on. Similarly, if there is no deadline, let
be the expected expected payoff of researching alternative x if the DM adopts from next period on an optimal plan. By definition of W k and V ,
To each k 1 we can associate a (k-optimal) policy correspondence s k : P ◆ A given by
Note that x 2 s k (p) if and only if W k (p) = W x k (p). From theorem 3.1, if there is a finite deadline, a Markovian plan is optimal if and only if the associated policy satisfies f t (p) 2 s t t (p) for every p 2 P. Similarly, let the (stationary optimal) policy correspondence s ⇤ : P ◆ A be defined by
Note that x 2 s ⇤ (p) if and only if V (p) = V x (p). From theorem 3.1, if there is no deadline, a stationary plan is optimal if and only if the associated policy satisfies f (p) 2 s ⇤ (p) for every p 2 P. From corollary 3.1, s k (p) is a set of approximate best responses to the problem with no deadline, and the approximation gets arbitrarily better as k increases.
Moreover, since the action set is finite, for every p there is a finite k such that s k (p) = s ⇤ (p) for all k k.
Since V and W k for k 0 are continuous, the objective functions in the problems defining s ⇤ (p) and s k (p) are continuous. It follows from Berge's (1963) maximum theorem that the stationary optimal policy correspondence and the koptimal policy correspondences are nonempty and upper-semicontinuous.
The optimal policy correspondence partitions the state space P into regions in which different actions are optimal. In particular, we let
represent, respectively the regions in which research is strictly better that stopping in the problem with k periods ahead and in the stationary problem. Naturally, the research area is larger the longer the remaining time before the deadline.
The statement of the corollary follows.
Regardless of the horizon, the value function is bounded by the probability that at least one of the alternative is good, that is 1 '
x (1 p x ). Hence, a simple upper bound to R is given by
We may wonder about the relation between the exploration problem and the bandit literature. We can treat the DM as choosing between n + 1 arms, the first n arms representing the decision to explore each of the alternatives and the reminder arm representing the decision to stop and exploit the top alternative. The value of exploring each alternative and the value of stopping are, of course, not independent. The effect of exploring each alternative on the value of stopping depends not only on the state of that alternative (that is, the beliefs of the decision-maker about that alternative) but also on the states of the other alternatives. Thus, the value of exploring each alternative is not independent of the states of the other alternatives. Per contra, an index formulation (see e.g. equation 2 in Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) ) would require writing the value of exploring each alternative as a function of two variables, the state of the alternative and an auxiliary index representing the value of other arms. In our problem, the value of the outside option to keep exploring the alternative changes depending on the states of the other alternatives.
Optimal exploration with one period ahead
When there is only one period before the deadline, the DM's problem is whether to stop immediately and take the best alternative, or to investigate one of the alternatives and then choose the best alternative given updated beliefs. In this section, we show that, in the optimal plan one period before the deadline, the DM is indifferent between investigating the top and the second alternative and will not investigate any alternative inferior to the top two. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for investigating any alternative to be optimal regardless of the number of periods ahead.
For any vector p 2 [0, 1] n we let (p [1] , . . . , p [n] ) be a permutation of p such that
For notational convenience, for given q define
We have Theorem 4.1.
Proof. In view of corollary 3.2, we can restrict our attention to vectors of prior beliefs such that p 1 p 2 . . . p n . The payoffs of researching alternatives 1 and 2 are, respectively,
The payoff of researching any alternativex such that px < p 2 is
From the preceding argument, researching the top two alternatives has the same expected payoff. Moreover, researching an alternative with a belief smaller than the top two is strictly dominated by researching either of the top two, except in the case in which researching any alternative has payoff equal to c + dp 1 . Since c + dp 1 < p 1 , however, in this case the only optimal action is to stop. It follows that it is never optimal to research an alternative with belief strictly below the top two. Now researching any of the top two alternatives is strictly better than stopping if
The statement of the theorem follows.
We can now derive a necessary and sufficient condition for research to be optimal for some beliefs that holds regardless of whether there is or not a deadline, and regardless of the remaining time before the deadline. < p [1] or equivalently if dp 2 [1] (2q 1) p [1] (2dq 1) + c < 0. Minimizing the expression in the left-hand side with respect to p [1] , we obtain that there is p [1] such that the last inequality holds if and only if the upper bound on c in the statement of the corollary is satisfied.
Note that if R 1 is empty, then s 1 (p) 3 {s} for all p, which implies W 1 = W 0 . Recursively, it follows that W k = W 0 for every k, and R k is empty for all k 2. From convergence (theorem 3.1), we get V = W 0 . But then R is empty as well. Then the bound holds for R k for k 1 and for R as well.
It is easy to check that increasing d relaxes the bound in the statement of the corollary, and increasing q relaxes the bound if dq 1/2. That is, quite intuitively, exploration is optimal if patience and the quality of information are large enough compared to the cost. In particular, c < 1/4 is required for exploration to be optimal.
We can rewrite the condition on prior beliefs for research to be optimal from theorem 4.1 as
It is easy to see that if R 1 is nonempty, then it is strictly increasing in q (since p 1 + p 2 > 2p 1 p 2 for 1 > p 1 p 2 > 0) and in d, and strictly decreasing in c.
To illustrate theorem 4.1, suppose c = 0.002, d = 0.98, and n = 2. Figure 4 depicts the research area for increasing values of the quality of information, namely q = 2/3 on top and q = 5/6 below, with p 1 and p 2 in the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. In both cases, the area in between the blue lines represents R 1 ; the (partially overlapping) areas in green and orange represent additions to the research area for longer horizons which will be explained in the next section.
The following corollary establishes some useful facts about R 1 for future reference. Intuitively, it says that beliefs in R 1 cannot be too far off the diagonal, in the sense that bad news about the top alternative or good news about the second top alternative necessarily change the order between the two top.
Corollary 4.2.
(ii) For every p 2 P,
Optimal exploration with two periods ahead
In this section we show that, two periods before the deadline, if it is optimal to investigate any alternative, then either the DM prefers to investigate the top alternative and stop after good news, or prefers to investigate the second alternative and stop after bad news, or is indifferent between the top two and expects to stop the following period with probability one. DefineŴ
. These are the payoffs associated with investigating the first alternative and stopping after good news, and with investigating the second alternative and stopping after bad news. Obviously, W 2 (p) W
2 (p) W 2 (p). Theorem 5.1 below can be summarized by the equation
Theorem 5.1 also provides the boundary between the regions in whichŴ 2 (p) andW 2 (p) are the optimal payoffs. In particular, for given q, d, c define
The theorem establishes thatŴ 2 (p) W 2 (p) if and only if B(p) 0. It follows that investigating the second alternative, with the expectation of investigating again only after good news, can be optimal only if there is a fixed cost of investigation and beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic. Intuitively, under these conditions, investigating the second alternative is more likely to end exploration earlier than investigating the top alternative, thus saving expected exploration costs: given c > 0 and p [1] + p [2] < 1, the difference in the two probabilities of stopping is q [2] (p) q +
[1] (p) > 0. Note also that, even if the third alternative (if it exists) is not chosen optimally, beliefs about the third alternative affect which of the top two alternatives is optimal to investigate. This is because the third alternative may become relevant in the following period in case of bad news about the top alternative. In particular, the decision between investigating the top two alternatives cannot be settled optimally without taking into account beliefs about other alternatives.
We have
We can illustrate theorem 5.1 using figure 4. Recall that in the figure we assume c = 0.002, d = 0.98, and n = 2, with q = 2/3 above and q = 5/6 below. In both cases, the green area represents the initial beliefs in which it is optimal to investigate the second alternative, stop after bad news, and investigate either alternative after good news, so that W 2 (p) =W 2 (p). The orange area represents the initial beliefs in which it is optimal to investigate the top alternative, stop after good news, and investigate either alternative after bad news, so that W 2 (p) =Ŵ 2 (p). The blue area that does not overlap the green or orange areas represents initial beliefs such that it is optimal to investigate either alternative and to stop afterwards regardless of whether news are good or bad, so that W 2 (p) = W 1 (p) > p [1] . That is, the nonoverlapped blue areas illustrate case (i) in the theorem, while the orange and blue areas illustrate case (ii). Note that the orange and green areas are the beliefs such that the expected utility of the decision maker increases with a larger horizon.
As figure 4 illustrates, if beliefs about the top two alternatives are nearly equal then it is optimal to investigate only once; if beliefs are asymmetric and relatively optimistic, it is optimal to investigate the top alternative with the expectation of stopping after good news; and if beliefs are asymmetric and relatively pessimistic, it is optimal to investigate the second alternative with the expectation of stopping after bad news. Remarkably, the boundary between pessimistic and optimistic beliefs is independent of the quality of information if there are only two alternatives.
To prove the theorem, we proceed via a series of lemmata. We first claim that any alternative below the top three according to initial beliefs is irrelevant for the optimal plan.
Lemma 5.1. If p x < p [3] , then x / 2 s 2 (p), and moreover, p [x] 
Using corollary 3.2 and lemma 5.1, in the remainder of this section we suppose without loss of generality n = 3 and p 1 p 2 p 3 . Lemma 5.2 establishes that investigating the third alternative is dominated by other plans. (Beliefs about the third alternative are not, however, irrelevant for deciding the optimal plan, as discussed later on.)
Lemma 5.2. EitherŴ 2 (p) W 3 2 (p) (with strict inequality if p 3 < p 1 ), orW 2 (p) W 3 2 (p) (with strict inequality if p 3 < p 2 ), or p 1 > W 3 2 (p).
Lemma 5.3 establishes that it cannot be optimal to investigate the second alternative if it is optimal to continue investigating after bad news.
Lemma 5.3. If p 2 2 R 1 , thenŴ 2 (p) W 2 2 (p), with strict inequality if p 1 > p 2 .
Lemma 5.4 tackles case (i) of the theorem, corresponding to the situation where investigating leads to stopping the following period with certainty.
From the preceding arguments, if investigating does not lead to stopping with certainty the following period, it must be that either the DM investigates the top alternative and investigates again only after bad news, or the DM investigates the second alternative and investigates again only after good news. Lemma 5.5 ranks these two plans using the boundary condition B(p).
Lemma 5.5.Ŵ 2 (p) RW 2 (p) () B(p) R 0.
Proof of theorem 5.1. From lemmata 5.1 and 5.2, we know that investigating any alternative below the top two cannot be optimal. From corollary 4.2, we know that investigating the top alternative leads to stopping after good news. From lemma 5.3, we know that investigating the second alternative, if optimal, leads to stopping after bad news. Hence, the optimal plan is either stopping, or investigating either alternative and stopping for sure as if there were only one period ahead, or investigating the top alternative and investigating again only after bad news, or investigating the second alternative and investigating again only after good news. The case in which investigating is followed by stopping for sure is handled by lemma 5.4. Lemma 5.5 ranks the last two plans.
We can check that both cases (i) and (ii) of the theorem are relevant for some beliefs for any parameters d, q, c such that R 1 6 = / 0. In particular, if beliefs about the top two alternatives are close, and beliefs about the third alternative lag far behind, or there is no third alternative, the optimal plan is to search only once either of the top two alternatives and then stop. If instead beliefs about the second and the third alternative are close enough, the optimal plan is to search the top alternative and search again only after bad news.
In sum, the previous two sections tell us that, with two or fewer periods before the deadline: (i) optimal exploration is restricted to the top two alternatives; (ii) starting from any initial beliefs such that it is optimal to explore, it is optimal to stop the following period after either good news, bad news, or both; (iii) if it is optimal to stop next period after good news but not after bad news, then it is optimal to explore only the top alternative; (iv) if it is optimal to stop next period after bad news but not after good news, then it is optimal to explore only the second alternative; and (v) if it is optimal to stop next period after both good news and bad news, then it is optimal to explore the top and the second top alternative (i.e. the DM is indifferent). In the next section we show that (iii), (v), and a slightly weaker version of (iv), hold for a longer horizon. The following section provides a numerical example to establish that (i) and (ii) do not generalize.
Optimal exploration with three periods ahead
We focus in this section on boundary points, that is, beliefs such that it is optimal to search and there is strictly positive probability of stopping the following period. We show that with three periods ahead of the deadline, it is optimal to investigate either of the top two alternatives at boundary points. We show by counterexample in the following section that this is not true for interior points, that is beliefs such that it is optimal to investigate again after both good and bad news.
We proceed by a series of lemmata.
The proof follows from similar arguments in the previous two sections and extends to any given horizon.
Theorem 6.1 follows straightforwardly from the three lemmata above.
An example with three periods ahead
With up to two periods before the deadline, the optimal plan limits exploration to the top two alternatives and, starting from any initial beliefs such that it is optimal to explore, to stop with positive probability the following period. That is, for k  2, every search point in the space of beliefs is a boundary point. For longer horizons, neither of these two properties hold. To illustrate this, suppose n = 3, k = 3, d = 0.98, c = 0.002 and q = 0.7. We illustrate in figures 7.1 and 7.2 all plans that are optimal for some beliefs p 2 (0, 1) 3 . Plans are described by decision trees, starting with the initial decision node on top. The symbol s indicates that the optimal decision is to stop (and choose the alternative with the largest probability of being high quality). The symbol [x] for x 2 {1, 2, 3} indicates that it is optimal to investigate the first, the second, or the third alternative in terms of their probability of being high quality as updated at that node. Note that because of the arrival of news about the alternatives, the order of the alternatives may change over the decision tree. A branch going down to x indicates the decision after bad news about alternative x, while a branch going down to x+ indicates the decision after good news about alternative x. When the decision is to stop after both good and bad news, a unique branch follows a decision node. The shortest possible optimal plan is to stop immediately, as in figure 7.1(a) . If it is optimal to explore at most one period ahead, as in figure 7.1(b) , the optimal plan is as described by theorem 4.1. That is, it is optimal to explore either of the top two alternatives with indifference between the two. If it is optimal to explore at most two periods ahead, as in figure 7.1(c) , the optimal plans are as described by theorem 5.1. That is, it is optimal either to investigate the top alternative, and to stop after good news, or to investigate the second alternative, and to stop after bad news.
If under the optimal plan there may be exploration three periods ahead, there is a variety of optimal plans, as described in figure 7.2. The first row of plans corresponds to boundary points: there is a positive probability of stopping after every investigation decision along each decision tree. In agreement with theorem 6.1, only the top two alternatives can be optimally investigated at boundary points. In particular, in agreement with lemma 6.2, if good news lead to stop, it is optimal to investigate the top alternative. The other rows correspond to plans such that after the first investigation decision there is probability one of investigating again. In particular, the last row corresponds to a plan such that it is optimal to explore indifferently either of the three alternatives.
In table 7.1 we have tabulated the frequency with which of the possible plans is optimal, under the assumption that the initial vector of beliefs p is distributed uniformly over the cube (0, 1) 3 . We have grouped the plans according to initial action and maximum length of exploration. An empty cell indicates impossibility. The most populated among the exploration cells in table 7.1 corresponds to plans with the maximum possible length of three periods and starting with investigating the top alternative. Among these plans, and among all plans involving exploration, the most frequent is the first plan to the left in the top row of figure  7 .2, with a frequency of 31.8532%. It corresponds to investigating the top alternative, stopping after good news, and investigating again the top alternative after bad news, in which case good news lead to stop and bad news lead to investigate again. The second most populated cell corresponds to plans with the maximum length in which it is indifferent to start with the top or the second top alternative. Among these plans, the most frequent is the first plan to the left in the fourth row of figure 7.2, with a frequency of 8.7496%. It corresponds to investigating the top alternative after both good news and bad news, and then stopping after good news and investigating again after bad news. The third most populated cell corresponds to the third plan to the left in figure 7.1. It requires to investigate the top alternative, stop after good news, and investigate either of the top two after bad news. For the parameters chosen, then, under a uniform distribution of initial beliefs, stopping most likely occurs after good news about the top alternative, except near the deadline.
Conclusions
Sequential experimentation problems are ubiquitous in economics and politics among other fields (e.g. biology), and have received a great deal of attention over the years. The current paper studies a simple experimentation problem, focusing on the sequence of exploration, or alternatives to research, prior to making a final choice from among the available alternatives. Conditional on being chosen, any alternative from a given available set yields a fixed per period payoff of either one with some (interior) probability, or zero with the complementary probability. In any one period, a decision maker (DM) either chooses either to research an alternative at a fixed cost or make a final choice of an available alternative. Research yields only an informative but noisy signal of the value of the alternative under consideration (either "good news" signaling a positive payoff, or "bad news" signaling a zero payoff); payoffs from any alternative accrue only if the DM stops exploration and chooses the alternative. Exploring any given alternative repeatedly is feasible but resuming exploration after making a choice is prohibitively costly.
Save for characterizing when it is optimal to research (corollary 4.1), identifying the optimal policy in general seems analytically intractable. The complication here is that the (endogenous) value of exploring any alternative in a given period is not independent of the values of other alternatives, despite payoff val-ues of the feasible alternatives being statistically independent. There is thus no available Gittins-type of index theorem available. A characterization of the optimal policy function at boundary points, 4 however, is available for when there are at most three remaining search periods (k  3). In particular, all research points are boundary points when there are at most two remaining search periods (theorems 4.1 and 5.1), although this is not true for (k 3) ( figure 7.2) .
In any period, order alternatives by decreasing likelihood that they yield a payoff of one. Then the main results for when there are at most three available search periods are easily summarized. Assume the optimal plan is followed in the current period. If it is optimal to investigate an alternative x now but to stop next period after 1. both good news and bad news, then x must be one of the top two alternatives for any number of search periods (k 1), with the DM being indifferent between the top and second ranked alternatives when k = 1;
2. good news but not after bad news, then x must be the top ranked alternative if k 2 {2, 3};
3. bad news but not good news, then x must be one of the top two alternatives when k = 3; when k = 2, x must be the second best alternative if beliefs are 'sufficiently pessimistic' and the top alternative if beliefs are 'sufficiently optimistic.'
(1) is a general property of optimal exploration regardless of the search horizon.
(2) and (3) essentially say that, when there are at most three remaining search periods, receiving good news about an alternative implies it is optimal either to stop and choose that alternative, or to explore it further in the next period; receiving bad news about the alternative implies it is optimal either to stop and take the best alternative, or to explore that best alternative in the next period. These properties seem intuitive and we conjecture they generalize to the arbitrary search horizon case.
Two main motivations for the model are the nest-searches of eusocial insects (see e.g. Seeley, 2010) and, closer to home, searching for the best policy to implement some given collective goal. In this latter case, the model can be interpreted as a common value committee deliberation, whereby the committee engages in researching alternatives prior to reaching a decision. Natural extensions in this context include relaxing the common value assumption to some extent, for example by having individuals independently choose whether to pay the fixed cost to explore an alternative in any period (presuming only one such search per period) and reporting the findings back to the committee. In this case, reporting signals truthfully is individually rational but there is clearly a free-rider problem in regard to searching. We expect search will stop too soon relative to the optimal plan. Similarly, if discount rates are individually specific and the committee votes over when to stop search, the optimality of search depends on both the distribution of discount rates among individuals and the distribution of likelihoods that alternatives have positive value in any period (see Chan et al., 2017) . We leave such extensions for another time.
Appendix: Additional proofs
Proof of corollary 4.2:
Suppose without loss of generality p 1 p 2 . . . p n . For part (i), from theorem 4.1, if p 2 R 1 then W 1 1 (p) = W 2 1 (p) > p 1 . Using d < 1 and c 0, W 1 1 (p) > p 1 implies p 1 < p 2 (that is, researching alternative 1 is only worth if bad news lead to a change in the best alternative).
For part (ii), suppose p 1+ 2 R 1 . Then using part (i), p 1 = (p + 1 ) < p 2 , a contradiction.
For part (iii), suppose p 2 2 R 1 and p 2 p 3 . Then, using part (i), p 1 = (p 2
[1] ) < p 2 [2] = p 2 , a contradiction. For part (iv), note that the condition for p 2 2 R 1 is max{p 2 , p 3 } > (1 dq)p 1 + c dq d(2q 1)p 1 , while the condition for p 1 2 R 1 , depending on whether p 1  p 2 or p 1 > p 2 is either
which is weaker than the condition above in either case. ⇤ Proof of lemma 5.1: From theorem 4.1, we know that
Hence, x will not be in the top two alternatives the following period in the optimal plan. It follows that it does not affect the expected utility of the DM. ⇤
Proof of lemma 5.2:
It is easy to see that if p 3  p 2 (equivalently, p + 3  p 2 ), then investigating the third alternative is dominated. We suppose henceforth that p 3 > p 2 . Suppose first that p 3 , p 3+ 2 R 1 . Then
). with strict inequality if p 1 > p 3 . We have two cases; if p 1  p + 3 ,
Finally, suppose p 3 , p 3+ / 2 R 1 but W 3 2 (p) p 1 . Note that W 3 2 (p) p 1 implies p + 3 > p 1 and hence p + 2 > p 1 . Then
Proof of lemma 5.3: From corollary 4.2(iii), we know that p 2 2 R 1 implies p 3 > p 2 . Note that then W 2 2 (p 2 ) = c + dw(p 1 , p 3 ). Suppose first that p 2+ 2 R 1 . Then:
Suppose instead that p 2+ / 2 R 1 . Then: 
Suppose instead p 1 < p 3 . (The third alternative is relevant.) Using the preceding equation
From both cases we get that (Ŵ 2 (p) W 2 (p))/d = (2q 1)((1 d)p 1 p 2 (1 p 1 p 2 )c) +dq 1 (p)q 2 (p) max{p 3 p 1 , 0} = (2q 1)B(p), as desired. ⇤ Proof of corollary 5.1: For part (i), note that, given the premise, p [2]+ = p [1]+ / 2 R 1 (by corollary 4.2(ii)), and p [2] / 2 R 1 (by corollary 4.2(iii)). The desired result follows from theorem 5.1(i). For part (ii), note that, given the premise, p [1] = p [1] and p [2] [2] = p [2] , so that p 2 R 1 implies p [2] 2 R 1 . The desired result follows from theorem 5.1(ii). ⇤ Proof of lemma 6.2:
We proceed by contradiction. Assume without loss of generality that p 1 = max y2X p y , and suppose there is some p such that it is optimal to explore some alternative x with p x < p 1 , and moreover next period it is optimal to stop after good news but not after bad news. If p 1 p + x , it cannot be optimal to stop after good news about x but not after bad news, since the payoff of exploring is larger after good news, and after bad news alternative 1 is still available. Hence p + x > p 1 and the plan's payoff is
Since there is exploration at p x , we have W 2 (p x ) p 1 . Let the payoff of the optimal plan at p 2 P conditional on the true value of alternatives 1 and x be given by u(p|w 1 , w x ), and let u(p x |1, 1) = v, u(p x |0, 0) = w, u(p x |0, 1) = r and u(p x |1, 0) = t. Thus, W 2 (p x ) = p 1 p x v + (1 p 1 )(1 p x )w + (1 p 1 )p x r + p 1 (1 p x )t p 1 . We claim that r 0. It is simple to show that W 2 (p x ) p 1 and r w imply r 0; we prove below that r w. Now consider switching alternatives x and 1 at beliefs p and any posterior beliefs; this plan payoff is
The optimal plan and this deviation have the same expected payoffs, qw and q+(1 q)v in states of the world (w 1 , w x ) = (0, 0), (1, 1), respectively. Using the states of the world (w 1 , w x ) = (1, 0), (0, 1), we get
x )(q(1 t) + (1 q)r) > 0, where we use t < 1 and r 0. But this contradicts x being optimal.
We still have to prove that r w. More generally, for any pair of alternatives y, x, any p 2 P and any horizon k, let the payoff of the optimal plan at p conditional on the true value of alternatives x and y be given by u k (p|w y , w x ). We claim that, for k  2, u k (p|1, 0) u k (p|0, 0). The result is immediate if the optimal decision at p with horizon k is to stop. The result is also easy to establish for k = 1. Consider the case k = 2. If the decision is to investigate any alternative z 6 = y, x, we have , 0) ) 0. The desired result from u 1 (p|1, 0) u 1 (p|0, 0). The argument is similar if the decision is to investigate x. If the decision instead is to investigate y, we have
Since we are investigating y and we are in k = 2, we must have either p y = p [1] or p y = p [2] < p [1] . In either situation, we do not need to consider the case in which the optimal policy is to stop after both good and bad news, since then u 2 (p|1, 0)
Suppose first that p y = p [1] . Then equation 3 becomes |0, 0) ).
If the DM searches y, we get u 2 (p|1, 0) u 2 (p|0, 0) = q( c + dq) + (1 q)c.
From corollary 4.1, we have c < 1/4 and dq > 1/2, so the above expression is positive. Similarly, if the DM searches x, we get u 2 (p|1, 0) u 2 (p|0, 0) = q > 0, which finishes the proof. ⇤ Proof of lemma 6.3: As in the previous proof, we proceed by contradiction. Assume without loss of generality that p 1 = p [1] and p [2] = p 2 , and suppose there is some p such that it is optimal to explore some alternative x with p x < p 2 , and moreover next period it is optimal to stop after bad news but not after good news. The plan's payoff is q + x W 2 (p x+ ) + q x p 1 . Let the payoff of the optimal plan at p 2 P conditional on the true value of alternatives 2 and x be given by u(p|w 2 , w x ), and let u(p x+ |1, 1) = v, u(p x+ |0, 0) = w, u(p x+ |0, 1) = r and u(p x+ |1, 0) = t. Thus, V 2 (p x+ ) = p 2 p
x v + (1 p 2 )(1 p x )w + (1 p 2 )p x r + p 2 (1 p x )t p 1 . Now consider switching alternatives x and 2 at beliefs p and any posterior beliefs; this plan payoff is q + 2W 2 (p 2+ ) + q 2 p 1 , whereW 2 (p 2+ ) = p 2 p x v + (1 p 2 )(1 p x )w + (1 p 2 )p x t + p 2 (1 p x )r. The optimal plan and this deviation have the same expected payoffs, (1 q)w+qp 1 and qv + (1 q)p 1 in states of the world (w 2 , w x ) = (0, 0), (1, 1), respectively. Using the states of the world (w 2 , w x ) = (1, 0), (0, 1), we get (q + 2W 2 (p 2+ ) + q 2 p 1 ) (q + x W 2 (p x+ ) + q x p 1 ) = (p 2 (1 p x )(qr + (1 q)p 1 ) + (1 p 2 )p x ((1 q)t + qp 1 )) (p 2 (1 p x )(qt + (1 q)p 1 ) + (1 p 2 )p x ((1 q)r + qp 1 )) = p 2 (1 p x )q(r t) + (1 p 2 )p x (1 q)(t r) = (p 2 (1 p x )q (1 p 2 )p x (1 q))(r t), which is positive if r > t. We prove below that either r > t, which contradicts x being optimal, or r = t so that switching alternatives x and 2 leads to the same payoff, but the plan after the switch is itself suboptimal, which contradicts x being optimal.
Suppose first that 1) p + x p 1 . 1.1) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after both good and bad news. In that case it is optimal to explore either x or 1. If we explore x we get r = q + (1 q)p 1 > qp 1 = t. If instead we explore 1 we get r = qp 1 + q 1 > qp 1 = t. 1.2) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after good news and search again after bad news. In this case it is optimal to explore x. We get r = q + (1 q)W 1 (p) > qW 1 (p) = t, where p is the original belief vector. 1.3) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after bad news and search again after good news. In that case it is optimal to explore 1. We get r = q 1 +q + 1 u 1 (p 1+,x+ |0, 1) and t = q + 1 u 1 (p 1+,x+ |1, 0), where r > t since u 1 (p 1+,x+ |0, 1) > u 1 (p 1+,x+ |1, 0) regardless of whether the DM explore 1 or x at p 1+,x+ with one period ahead. Suppose 2) p 2 < p + x < p 1 . 2.1) If the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after both good and bad news, we get the same result as in the previous paragraph.
2.2) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after good news and search again after bad news. In this case it is optimal to explore 1. We get r = qp 1 + (1 q)u 1 (p 1 ,x+ |0, 1) and t = qp 1 + (1 q)u 1 (p 1 ,x+ |1, 0). If the DM explores x or 1 at p 1 ,x+ with one period ahead we get the desired result; if the DM explores 2 we get r = t so that switching alternatives x and 2 leads to the same payoff. Note that after switching the DM explores x at p 1 ,2+ , which is suboptimal since by the premise p x < p 1 and by theorem 4.1 it is not optimal to explore third alternatives with one period ahead.
2.3) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after bad news and search again after good news. In that case it is optimal to explore x. We get r = qu 1 (p x++ |0, 1) + (1 q)p 1 and t = (1 q)u 1 (p x++ |1, 0) + qp 1 . If we explore 1 at p x++ with one period ahead, we get u 1 (p x++ |0, 1) = qp 1 + (1 q) and u 1 (p x++ |1, 0) = qp 1 which yields r > t. If we explore x at p x++ with one period ahead, we get u 1 (p x++ |0, 1) = q + (1 q)p 1 and u 1 (p x++ |1, 0) = qp 1 which yields r > t.
3) Suppose p + x  p 2 . 3.1) It cannot be the case that the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after both good and bad news since then positive news about x is irrelevant and we can explore either 1 or 2 three periods ahead and stop after both good and bad news.
3.2) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after good news and search again after bad news. In this case it is optimal to explore 1. We get r = qp 1 + (1 q)u 1 (p 1 ,x+ |0, 1) and t = qp 1 + (1 q)u 1 (p 1 ,x+ |1, 0). The DM cannot explore optimally x at p 1 ,x+ with one period ahead since p + < p 2 . If the DM explores 1 we get r = qp 1 + (1 q)(qp 1 + q 1 ) > qp 1 + (1 q)qp 1 . If the DM explores 2 at p 1 ,x+ with one period ahead, we get r = t so that switching alternatives x and 2 leads to the same payoff. Note that after switching the DM explores x at p 1 ,2+ , which is suboptimal since by the premise p x < p 1 and by theorem 4.1 it is not optimal to explore third alternatives with one period ahead.
3.3) Suppose the decision at p + x with two periods ahead is to stop after bad news and search again after good news. In that case it is optimal to explore 2. But then after bad news we choose 1 and after good news we explore either 1 or 2, so searching x in the first place cannot be optimal. ⇤
